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Introduction
Liskov, Rivest and Wagner [10] defined the notion of a tweakable blockcipher and put forward the thesis that these objects make a good starting point for doing blockcipher-based cryptographic design. In this paper we describe a good way to build a tweakable blockcipher E out of an ordinary blockcipher E. Used as intended, our constructions, XE and XEX, add just a few machine instructions to the cost of computing E. We illustrate the use of these constructions by improving on the authenticated-encryption scheme OCB [15] and the message authentication code PMAC [4] .
Tweakable blockciphers. Schroeppel [16] designed a blockcipher, Hasty Pudding, wherein the user supplies a non-secret spice and changing this spice produces a completely different permutation. Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [10] formally defined the syntax and security measures for such a tweakable blockcipher, and they suggested that this abstraction makes a desirable starting point to design modes of operation and prove them secure. They suggested ways to build a tweakable blockcipher E out of a standard blockcipher E, as well as ways to modify existing blockcipher designs to incorporate a tweak. They illustrated the use of these objects. Formally, a tweakable blockcipher is a map E: K × T × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n where each E T K (·) = E(K, T, ·) is a permutation and T is the set of tweaks.
Our contributions. We propose efficient ways to turn a blockcipher E: K × {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n into a tweakable blockcipher E: K × T × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n . (See Appendix A for the best constructions formerly known.) Our powering-up constructions, XE and XEX, preserve the key space and blocksize of E but endow E with a tweak space T = {0, 1}
n × I where I is a set of tuples of integers, like I = [1 ..
. 10]. The XE construction turns a CPA-secure blockcipher into a CPA-secure tweakable blockcipher, while XEX turns a CCAsecure blockcipher into a CCA-secure tweakable blockcipher. (CPA stands for chosen-plaintext attack and CCA for chosen-ciphertext attack.) The methods are highly efficient when tweaks arise in sequence, with most tweaks (N, i) being identical to the prior tweak (N, i ) except for incrementing a component of i.
As an illustrative and useful example, consider turning a conventional blockcipher E: K×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n into a tweakable blockcipher E: K×T ×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n by defining E . We show that E is secure (as a strong, tweakable PRP) as long as E is secure (as a strong, untweakable PRP). Computing E N i j K (X) will usually cost about 1 shift, 1 conditional, and 3-4 xors more than computing E K (X).
We illustrate how the use of tweakable blockciphers during mode design, followed by the instantiation of the tweakable blockcipher with an ordinary blockcipher using one of our constructions, can give rise to modes that are simpler, faster, and easier to prove correct than what designing directly from a blockcipher has delivered. We do this by refining two already-optimized modes, OCB [15] and PMAC [4] , yielding new modes, OCB1 and PMAC1, that are are easier to understand, easier to implement, and faster. Computing offsets in the new modes does not involve Gray-code sequence or counting the number of trailing zero bits in successive integers. OCB1 eliminates the utility of preprocessing, saving a blockcipher call.
Intuition. The idea behind the powering-up constructions can be explained like this. Apart from Gray-code reordering, PMAC authenticates an m-block message using a sequence of offsets L, 2L, 3L, . . . , (m − 1)L, where multiplication is in the finite field F 2 n and Further related work. Halevi and Rogaway [7] used the sequence of offsets 2L, 2 2 L, 2 3 L, . . . , in their EME mode. They give no general results about this construction, and EME did not use tweakable blockciphers, yet this offset ordering was our starting point.
Preliminaries
The field with 2 n points. Let F 2 n denote the field with 2 n points and let F * 2 n be its multiplicative subgroup. We interchangeably think of a point a ∈ F 2 n as an n-bit string, a formal polynomial of degree n−1, or as an integer in [0 ..
To represent points select a primitive polynomial, say the lexicographically first one among the degree n polynomials having a minimum number of nonzero coefficients. For n = 128 the indicated polynomial is p 128 (x) = x 128 + x 7 + x 2 + x + 1. Saying that p n (x) is primitive means that it is irreducible over F 2 and 2 (i.e., x) generates all of F * 2 n . It is computationally simple to multiply a ∈ {0, 1} n by 2. To illustrate for n = 128, 2a = a< <1 if firstbit(a) = 0 and 2a = (a< <1) ⊕ 0 120 10 4 1 3 if firstbit(a) = 1. One can easily multiply by other small constants, as 3a = 2a ⊕ a and 5a = 2(2a) ⊕ a and so forth.
Blockciphers and tweakable blockciphers. We review the standard definitions for blockciphers and their security [2] and the extension of these notions to tweakable blockciphers [10] . A blockcipher is a function E: K×{0, 1} n → {0, 1} n where n ≥ 1 is a number and K is a finite nonempty set and
n where n and K are as above and T is a nonempty set and
is a permutation for all K ∈ K and T ∈ T . For blockciphers and tweakable blockciphers we call n the blocksize and K the key space. For tweakable blockciphers we call T the tweak space.
Let Perm(n) be the set of all permutations on n bits. Let Perm(T , n) be the set of all mappings from T to permutations on n bits. In writing π $ ← Perm(n) we are choosing a random permutation π(·) on {0, 1} n . In writing π
n is a blockcipher then its inverse is the blockcipher
a tweakable blockcipher then its inverse is the tweakable blockcipher
where
An adversary is a probabilistic algorithm with access to zero or more oracles. Without loss of generality, adversaries never ask a query for which the answer is trivially known: an adversary does not repeat a query, does not ask D K (Y ) after receiving Y in response to a query E K (X), and so forth. Oracles will have an implicit domain of valid queries and, for convenience, we assume that all adversarial queries lie within that domain. This is not a significant restriction because membership can be easily tested for all domains of interest to us. 
Of course D and D denote the inverses of blockciphers E and E. In writing A ⇒ 1 we are referring to the event that the adversary A outputs the bit 1.
In the usual way we lift advantage measures that depend on an adversary to advantage measures that depend on named resources: Adv xxx Π (R) = max A {Adv xxx Π (A)} over all adversaries A that use resources at most R. The resources of interest to us are the total number of oracle queries q and the total length of those queries σ and the running time t. For convenience, the total length of queries will be measured in n-bit blocks, for some understood value of n, so a query X contributes |X| n to the total, where |X| n means max{|X|/n, 1}. Running time, by convention, includes the description size of the algorithm relative to some standard encoding. When we speak of authenticity, the block length of the adversary's output is included in σ.
The XE and XEX Constructions
Goals. We want to support tweak sets that look like T = {0, 1}
n × I where I is a set of tuples of integers. In particular, we want to be able to make I the cross product of a large subrange of integers, like [1 .. 
Tweaks arise in some sequence T 1 , T 2 , . . . and we will obtain impressive efficiency only to the extent that most tweaks are an increment of the immediately prior one. When we say that tweak T = (N, i 1 , . . . , i k ) is an increment of another tweak we mean that one of i 1 , . . . , i k got incremented and everything else stayed the same. The second component of tweak (N, i 1 , . . . , i k ), meaning i 1 , is the component that we expect to get incremented most often. We want there to be a simple, constant-time procedure to increment a tweak at any given component of I. To increment a tweak it shouldn't be necessary to go to memory, consult a table, or examine which number tweak this in in sequence. Incrementing tweaks should be endianindependent and avoid extended-precision arithmetic. Efficiently incrementing tweaks shouldn't require precomputation. Tweaks that are not the increment of a prior tweak will also arise, and they will typically look like (N, 1, 0 . . . , 0). Constructions should be reasonably efficient in dealing with such tweaks.
We emphasize that the efficiency measure we are focusing on is not the cost of computing E T K (X) from scratch-by that measure our constructions will not be particularly good. Instead, we are interested in the cost of computing E T K (X) given that one has just computed E S K (X ) and T is obtained by incrementing S at some component. Most often that component will have been the second component of S. It is a thesis underlying our work, supported by the design of OCB1 and PMAC1, that one will often be able to arrange that most tweaks are an increment to the prior one.
Tweaking with ∆ = 2
i N. Recall that we have chosen to represent points in F 2 n using a primitive polynomial, not just an irreducible one. This means that the point 2 is a generator of F 2 n : the points 1, 2, 2 2 , 2 3 , . . . , 2 2 n −2 are all distinct. This property turns out to be the crucial one that lets us construct from a blockcipher E:
The tweak set is T = {0, 1} n × I where I = [1 .. 2 n − 2] and the tweakable blockcipher just described is denoted E = XEX[E, 2 I ] . When computing the
K (M i ) computation but the first uses one blockcipher call and one doubling operation. Doubling takes a shift followed by a conditional xor. We call the construction above, and all the subsequent constructions of this section, powering-up constructions.
To facilitate mode design we may want tweaks that look like (N, i, j) where N ∈ {0, 1} n and i is an integer from a large set I, like
, and j is an integer from some small set J, like J = {0, 1}. To get the "diversity" associated to the various j-values we just multiply by 3 instead of 2. That is, we construct from a blockcipher E:
The tweakable blockcipher just described is denoted E = XEX[E, 2 I 3 J ]. Incrementing the tweak at component i is done by doubling, while incrementing the tweak at component j is done by tripling.
The XEX construction. Generalizing the two examples above, we have the following definition.
Definition 2 (XEX). Let E: K × {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher, let
The XE construction. As made clear in the work of Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner [10] , constructions of the form E
⊕∆ aim for chosenciphertext attack (CCA) security, while for chosen-plaintext attack (CPA) security one can omit the outer xor. Thus we consider the construction E K (M ⊕ ∆). This is slightly more efficient than XEX, saving one xor.
Definition 3 (XE). Let
2 n , and
Parameter Sets Yielding Unique Representations
It is easy to see that the XE and XEX constructions can only "work" if α
This motivates the following definition.
Definition 4 (Unique Representations). Fix a group G.
A choice of parameters is a list α 1 , . . . , α k ∈ G of bases and a set
indices. We say that the choice of parameters provides unique representations if for every
In other words, representable points are uniquely representable: any group element α
k that can be represented using allowed indices can be represented in only one way (using allowed indices).
For tweak spaces of practical interest, discrete-log calculations within F * 2 n can be used to help choose and verify that a given choice of parameters provides unique representations. This and subsequent discrete logs were computed using a Maple-implementation combining the Pohlig-Hellman [11] and Pollard-rho [12] 
Security of XE
The following result quantifies the security of the XE construction. 
2 n where t = t + ckn(q + 1) for some absolute constant c. 2
In English, the XE construction promotes a CPA-secure blockcipher to a CPA-secure tweakable blockcipher, assuming that the chosen base elements and range of allowed indices provide unique representations. The proof is in [14] . 
Security of XEX
This allows the adversary to defeat the CCA-security. For example, enciphering 2M = 2N with a tweak of (0 n , 1) and enciphering 4M = 4N with a tweak of (0 n , 2) will give identical results (if the adversary has the construction-based enciphering oracle). Corresponding to this attack we exclude any tweak (N, i 1 , . . . , i k ) for which (i 1 , . . . , i k ) is a representative of 1-that is, any tweak (N, i 1 , . . . , i k ) for which α i1 1 . . . α i k k = 1. In particular, this condition excludes any tweak (N, 0, . . . , 0). The proof of the following is omitted, as Theorem 3 will be more general. 1 and let α 1 , . . . , α k ∈ F * 2 n be base elements and let I 1 ×· · ·×I k be allowed indices such that these parameters provide unique representations. Assume α
Theorem 2 (Security of XEX). Fix n ≥
where t = t + ckn(q + 1) for some absolute constant c. 2
An Almost-Free Alternative to Key Separation
When combining two blockcipher-based cryptographic mechanisms into a composite mechanism, it is, in general, essential to use two different keys. Either these two keys together comprise the key for the joint mechanism, or else each key is obtained from an underlying one by a key-derivation technique. The first possibility increases the key length in the composite mechanism while the second involves extra computation at key setup. Both possibilities incur the inefficiency of blockcipher re-keying when the combined mode runs. For all of these reasons, some new "composite" modes of operation have gone to considerable trouble in order to make do (for their particular context) with a single blockcipher key. Examples include EAX, CCM, and OĊB [3, 13, 17] . Using a single key complicates proofs-when the mechanism works at all-because one can no longer reason about generically combining lower-level mechanisms. Tweakable blockciphers open up a different possibility: the same underlying key is used across the different mechanisms that are being combined, but one arranges that the tweaks are disjoint across different mechanisms. In this way one retains the modularity of design and analysis associated to using separate keys-one reasons in terms of generic composition-yet one can instantiate in a way that avoids having extra key material or doing extra key setups. Because the tweak space for XE and XEX is a Cartesian product of ranges of integers, it is easy, for these constructions, to separate the different tweaks.
Combining XE and XEX
Some blockcipher-based constructions need CCA-security in some places and CPA-security in other places. One could assume CCA-security throughout, later instantiating all blockcipher calls with a CCA-secure construction, but it might be better to use a CPA-secure construction where sufficient and a CCA-secure one where necessary. Regardless of subsequent instantiation, it is good to be able to talk, formally, about where in a construction one needs what assumption.
To formalize where in a construction one is demanding what, we tag each blockcipher call with an extra bit. We say that a tweakable blockcipher E: 
Definition 5 (Security of a Tagged, Tweakable Blockcipher). Let E: K× T × {0, 1}
n → {0, 1} n be a tagged, tweakable blockcipher and let A be an adversary. Then Adv
Naturally D, above, is the inverse of E. Security in the prp-sense and security in the ± prp-sense are special cases of security in the [±] prp sense (but for the enlarged tweak space).
If we combine XE and XEX using our tagging convention we get the tagged, tweakable blockcipher XEX * .
Definition 6 (XEX
* ). Let E: K × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n be a blockcipher, let α 1 , . . . , α k ∈ F * 2 n , and let I 1 , . . . , I k ⊆ Z. Then E = XEX * [E, α I1 1 · · · α I k k ] is the tweakable blockcipher E: K × ({0, 1} × {0, 1} n × I 1 · · · × I k ) × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n defined by E 0 N i1...i k K (M ) = E K (M ⊕ ∆) and E 1 N i1...i k K (M ) = E K (M ⊕ ∆) ⊕ ∆ where ∆ = α i1 1 α i2 2 · · · α i k k N and N = E K (N ). 2
Security of the Combined Construction
We now specify the security of the XEX * construction. The result encompasses that XE is prp-secure and XEX is ± prp-secure. The proof is in [14] .
Theorem 3 (Security of XEX
* ). Fix n ≥ 1 and let α 1 , . . . , α k ∈ F * 2 n be base elements and let I 1 ×· · ·×I k be allowed indices such that these parameters provide unique representations and such that α
The OCB1 Authenticated-Encryption Scheme
We recast OCB [15] to use a tweakable blockcipher instead of a conventional blockcipher. Liskov, Rivest, and Wagner first did this [10] , but our formulation is different from theirs. First, guided by what we have done so far, we choose a tweak space of
The first bit of the tweak is the tag; the effective tweak space is
. Second, we want tweaks to increase monotonically, and so we switch the "special" processing done in OCB from the penultimate block to the final block. The resulting algorithm is shown in Fig. 1 . Algorithm OCB1 is parameterized by a tweakable blockcipher E: K × T × {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n and a number τ ∈ [0 .. n].
For clarity, we write π give a couple of definitions from [15] . For privacy of a nonce-based encryption scheme Π = (K, E, D) we use the notion of indistinguishability-from-randomstrings, which defines Adv
is an oracle that, on input (N, M ), returns |M | random bits. The adversary is not allowed to repeat a nonce N . For authenticity we use the noncebased notion of integrity of ciphertexts: the adversary is given an encryption oracle E K (·, ·) and is said to forge if it outputs an (N, C) that is valid and C was not the result of any prior (N, M ) query. The adversary is not allowed to repeat a nonce N while it queries its encryption oracle. We write Adv
We have the following theorem for the informationtheoretic security of OCB1. The proof is in [14] . 
Theorem 4 (OCB1 with an Ideal Tweakable Blockcipher
Note that the authenticity bound is close to 2 −τ ; in particular, 2
The bounds do not degrade with the number of queries asked by the adversary, the length of these queries, or the time the adversary runs. For the complexity-theoretic analog we have the following. 
Corollary 1 (OCB1 with a Tweakable Blockcipher
The proof requires CPA-security for privacy but authenticity uses the notion that combines CPA-and CCA-security (Definition 5). It is here that one has formalized the intuition that the first m−1 tweakable-blockcipher calls to OCB1 need to be CCA-secure but the last two calls need only be CPA-secure.
To realize OCB1 with a conventional blockcipher E: Blockcipher-based OCB1 is more efficient than OCB. With OCB one expects to use preprocessing to compute a value L = E K (0 n ) and a collection of 2 i Lvalues. This is gone in OCB1; preprocessing is not useful there beyond setting up the underlying blockcipher key. Beyond this, with OCB processing the j th block involved xoring into the current offset a value L(i) = 2 i L where i = ntz(j) was the number of trailing zero-bits in the index j. In the absence of preprocessing, offset-calculations were not constant time. This too is gone.
The previous paragraph notwithstanding, the time difference or chip-area difference between optimized implementations of OCB and OCB1 will be small, since the overhead of OCB over a mode like CBC was already small. The larger gain is that the mode is simpler to understand, implement, and prove correct.
The PMAC1 Message Authentication Code
As with OCB, one can recast PMAC [4] to use a tweakable blockcipher and, having done so, one can instantiate the tweakable blockcipher, this time with the XE construction. The resulting algorithm, PMAC1, is simpler and more efficient than PMAC. In the latter construction one had to xor into the current offset a value L(i) = 2 i L where i was the number of trailing zero-bits in the current block index j. This is gone in PMAC1, and an implementation no longer needs to concern itself with Gray codes, precomputing L(i)-values, or finding the most efficient way to bring in the right L(i) value. Details are in [14] .
To make an authenticated encryption scheme that handles associated-data, combine OCB1 and PMAC1 [13] . Encrypt message M under key K, nonce N , and header H by OCB1.Encrypt 
Comments
Under the approach suggested by this paper, to get good efficiency for a design that uses a tweakable-blockcipher, the designer must accept certain design rules. In particular, the tweak space needs to look like {0, 1} n × BIG × SMALL for appropriate sets BIG and SMALL, and one needs to arrange that most tweaks be obtained by incrementing the prior one. It is a thesis implicit in this work that these restrictions are not overly severe.
Besides simplifying the design and proof for OCB and PMAC, we have improved their efficiency. The improvement are not large (the modes were already highly efficient), but performance improvements, of any size, was not a benefit formerly envisaged as flowing from the tweakable-blockcipher abstraction.
Somewhat strangely, our constructions depend on the relative easiness of computing discrete logarithms. I know of no other example where one needs to compute discrete logs in order to design or verify a mode of operation.
I end this paper by acknowledging that everyone writes block cipher, not blockcipher. Still, the time has come to spell this word solid. I invite you to join me.
Rogaway, Bellare, and Black [15] n by E i K (X) = E K (X ⊕∆) where ∆ = γ i L and L = E K (0 n ) and γ i is as before. The last two definitions ignore the "special" treatment afforded to blocks modified by xoring in 2 −1 L. The implicit intent [4, 15] was to use this mechanism to enlarge the tweak space by one bit, effectively taking the cross product with {0, 1}.
